The Bloom Tree by Ramabaja, Lum & Avdullahu, Arber
The Bloom Tree
Lum Ramabaja
lum@bloomlab.io
Arber Avdullahu
arber@bloomlab.io
Abstract— We introduce a data structure that allows for
efficient (probabilistic) presence proofs and non-probabilistic
absence proofs in a bandwidth efficient and secure way. The
Bloom tree combines the idea of Bloom filters with that of
Merkle trees. Bloom filters are used to verify the presence, or
absence of elements in a set. In the case of the Bloom tree, we
are interested to verify and transmit the presence, or absence of
an element in a secure and bandwidth efficient way to another
party. Instead of sending the whole Bloom filter to check for
the presence, or absence of an element, the Bloom tree achieves
efficient verification by using a compact Merkle multiproof.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Bloom filters
A Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data struc-
ture that allows to verify if an element is not in a set. In
other words, a Bloom filter can either tell us that an element
might be in a set, or that an element definitely is not in a
set. Bloom filters, and variants of the Bloom filter have found
a wide range of applications - They have been extensively
used in blockchains [1], for set reconciliation problems [2],
for memory-efficient genome assembly [3], and more. The
main reason why Bloom filters are used in so many domains
are their very low space complexity.
To populate a Bloom filter, we first initiate a zero bit array.
Whenever we want to insert an element to the Bloom filter,
we hash the element k times (as in figure 1), go to the indices
to which the hashes point, and turn those values to one. When
checking for the presence of an element in the Bloom filter,
we simply check if all the given indices have a one. If one
of the indices is still a zero, we know that the element was
never inserted into the Bloom filter. The false positive nature
of the Bloom filter comes from the fact that the values of
some indices for a given element might already be turned to
one, even though we never inserted the element. An observer
looking at figure 1 for example might think that element ”X”
was inserted to the Bloom filter, even though it was not.
The false positive rate of a Bloom filter can be controlled
by modifying three variables:
1) The Bloom filter size m.
2) The number of elements inserted into a Bloom filter
n.
3) The number of hash functions used per element k.
The formula of which can be written as:
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Fig. 1. Inserting multiple elements into a Bloom filter. ”X” was never
inserted, yet it appears as if it has, i.e. a false positive has occurred.
B. Merkle trees
A Merkle tree is a binary tree in which all leaf nodes
(i.e. the Merkle tree’s elements) are associated with a cryp-
tographic hash, and all none-leaf nodes are associated with
a cryptographic hash, that is formed from the hashes of its
child nodes (as shown in figure 2).
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Fig. 2. Depiction of a Merkle tree. The leaf nodes, i.e. the elements of a
Merkle tree, are written as ’Ti. The non-leaf nodes are written as Hj .
This simple structure allows for bandwidth-efficient and
secure verification of the presence of elements. To verify
that an element is present in the Merkle tree, one simply
has to provide a series of hashes, that when hashed with the
element hash, recreate the hash of the Merkle root (as shown
in figure 3). This series of hashes is also known as a Merkle
proof. It is assumed that the recipient of the Merkle proof
already has a copy of the Merkle root.
Merkle trees, like Bloom filters, have found a wide array
of applications. The Merkle tree is used as a fundamental
building block in blockchain systems [4], in time synchro-
nisation for batch signing requests [5], in peer-to-peer key-
value stores to check for the integrity of files [6], and more.
C. Sparse Merkle Multiproofs
A sparse Merkle multiproof (not to be confused with
sparse Merkle trees) is simply a more efficient Merkle proof,
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Fig. 3. Depiction of a Merkle tree, with the Merkle proof (shown in orange)
for a given element (T3).
for when it is necessary to prove the presence of a set of
elements that are in the same Merkle tree [7]. As shown in
figure 4, someone could use three Merkle proofs for the three
elements highlighted in blue. In this example, a node would
need nine hashes in total to verify the presence of the three
elements.
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Fig. 4. Three Merkle proofs for three different elements.
By using a sparse Merkle multiproof however, we can
drop the number of hashes needed to verify the presence of
a set of elements significantly. By overlapping the three trees
from figure 4 (as shown in figure 5), we can see that most
of the hashes can in fact be recreated by previous hashes.
Instead of using three separate Merkle proofs that consist of
nine hashes in total, one can prove the presence of the three
elements with only four hashes (as shown in figure 6. This
simple trick is also known as a sparse Merkle multiproof.
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Fig. 5. Three overlapped Merkle proofs.
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Fig. 6. An illustration of a Merkle multiproof.
II. THE BLOOM TREE
The Bloom tree is a probabilistic data structure that
combines the idea of Bloom filters with that of Merkle trees.
In the standard Bloom filter, we are interested to verify the
presence, or absence of elements in a set. In the case of
the Bloom tree, we are interested to verify and transmit the
presence, or absence of an element in a secure and bandwidth
efficient way to another party. Instead of sending the whole
Bloom filter to check for the presence, or absence of an
element, the Bloom tree achieves efficient verification by
using a compact Merkle multiproof.
The way a Bloom tree is computed is straightforward:
1) Divide the Bloom filter into chunks of bytes (8 bytes,
32 bytes, 64 bytes, or any other convenient size).
2) Hash each chunk with its given chunk index.
3) Compute a Merkle tree on top of the hashed chunks,
as shown in figure 7.
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Fig. 7. The Bloom tree. Each cell Ci represents a chunk of a Bloom filter.
To prove if an element is present, or absent in the Bloom
tree, we first hash a given element k times. Let’s say that we
have a Bloom tree with a chunk size of 32 bytes, and the
k hashes for a specific element are {800, 1602, 3650}. By
knowing an element’s k indices and the Bloom tree’s chunk
size, we can deduce which chunks of the Bloom filter are
needed to prove a given element inclusion, or non-inclusion.
In our example, it would be chunks C3, C6, and C14. We
can also deduce which indices inside each chunk must be
checked. In our case, to check index 800, we would check
index 31 inside chunk C3 (as one chunk contains 256 bits
in this example). For index 1602 we would check index 65
inside chunk C6, and for index 3650 we would check index
65 inside chunk C14.
If all of the values at the given indices are one, we provide
a presence proof. If even only one of the values at the given
indices is zero, we provide an absence proof. For a presence
proof, we simply provide the Merkle multiproof for the given
chunks, as shown in figure 8. Since each chunk gets hashed
with its index, we know that the provided proof cannot be
for another chunk (i.e. lying by providing a valid proof for
another chunk is not possible). For an absence proof, we
can simply provide a standard Merkle proof for one of the
chunks in which the index gets mapped to a zero value, as
shown in figure 9.
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Fig. 8. The Bloom tree with a Merkle multiproof (shown in orange) for a
certain element (shown in blue).
It is important to note that only false positives can occur in
Bloom filters, false negatives are not possible. In other words
a presence proof does not mean that an element was truly
inserted into the Bloom filter, it means that it might have been
inserted. An absence proof on the other hand means that an
element definitely has not been inserted into the Bloom filter.
III. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Design
We are interested to observe how the size of Bloom
tree proofs varies, depending on the chosen Bloom filter
parameters, as well as compare the proof sizes with their
corresponding Bloom filters. Nine grouped bar charts were
computed, and organized as a grid (as shown in figure 10).
Every bar chart in the same row used the same chunk size,
and every bar chart in the same column used the same false
positive rate. Chunks of size {8, 32, 64} (in bytes) were used,
and false positive rates of {0.1, 0.01, 0.001}. For every bar
chart four groups were computed. Each group compared the
size differences between absence proofs, presence proofs,
and the actual used bloom filter (measured in bytes). The
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Fig. 9. The Bloom tree with a standard Merkle proof (shown in orange)
for a certain element (shown in blue). In this particular case C3 contained
a zero at a given index. Instead of sending a Merkle multiproof, we only
send a standard Merkle proof, as well as C3 to prove the absence of the
element.
only difference between each group was the parameter n
(the number of elements used to populate e bloom fil-
ter). The chosen number of elements for each group were
{500, 1000, 5000, 10000}. As the size of a multiproof can be
different from element to element, we computed the median
multiproof size for each element from a sample of elements,
i.e. every presence proof in the bar charts is the median size
of a multiproof for a given bloom filter.
B. Results
Figure 10 shows the results of the experiment. It appears
that varying chunk sizes do not lead to a significant dif-
ference in proof sizes. As expected, larger chunk sizes will
lead to slightly larger absence proofs, and slightly smaller
presence proofs. The number of necessary computations
however decreases with increasing chunk size. Intuitively,
the larger a chunk size is, the fewer leaves there will be in
the Bloom tree, which leads to fewer non-leaf computations.
We can also see that the absence proofs and presence proofs
get proportionally smaller than the Bloom tree, the larger
the Bloom filter is. This also makes intuitive sense, as an
absence proof (which is technically just a standard merkle
proof) requires only log2(m) hashes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Bloom tree’s attributes appear to be of interest in two
scenarios:
1) When for whatever reason we have to store regularly
bloom filters.
2) When we want to provide a probabilistic presence
proof, or a non-probabilistic absence proof for individ-
ual elements to another party in a secure and bandwidth
efficient way, instead of sending whole bloom filters.
We believe that the Bloom tree will have particularly a lot
of applications in the peer-to-peer and blockchain space.
V. FUTURE WORK
The Bloom tree package used for the experiments (which
can be found on the Bloom Lab’s github page) uses a specific
variant of the sparse Merkle multiproof, which we name
500 1000 5000 10000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Fpr = 0.1,    Chunk Size = 8 bytes
Absence Proof Size
Presence Proof Size
Bloom Filter Size
500 1000 5000 10000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Fpr = 0.01,    Chunk Size = 8 bytes
500 1000 5000 10000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Fpr = 0.001,    Chunk Size = 8 bytes
500 1000 5000 10000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Nu
m
be
r o
f B
yt
es
 (s
ho
wn
 in
 lo
g2
) Fpr = 0.1,    Chunk Size = 32 bytes
500 1000 5000 10000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Fpr = 0.01,    Chunk Size = 32 bytes
500 1000 5000 10000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Fpr = 0.001,    Chunk Size = 32 bytes
500 1000 5000 10000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Fpr = 0.1,    Chunk Size = 64
500 1000 5000 10000
Number of Elements Inside Bloom Filter
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Fpr = 0.01,    Chunk Size = 64
500 1000 5000 10000
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Fpr = 0.001,    Chunk Size = 64
Fig. 10. Results of the experiments. Log2 scale was used for better visualization. A detailed explanation of the experiment setup is provided in subsection
III-A.
”compact Merkle multiproof” [8]. In a nutshell, the compact
Merkle multiproof is identical to a sparse Merkle multiproof,
but it incorporates an algorithm for proof construction and
verification, that allows us to send the hashes of a Merkle
multiproof without requiring any additional information,
such as hash indices.
In future work, we are going to show how one can
combine Bloom trees with distributed Bloom filters [9] to
create an ”interactive Boom proof”. We will show how the
interactive Bloom proof can be used to build a new kind
of blockchain architecture, that requires one magnitude less
storage, while still allowing nodes to independently verify
transaction validity.
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